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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TONI L. BIGGS, : Case No. 20051075-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(2002), whereby the defendant in a district court criminal action may take an appeal to 
the Court of Appeals from a final order for anything other than a first degree felony or a 
capital felony offense. Appellant Toni Biggs was convicted of attempted possession of a 
controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor offense under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (2002). A copy of the judgment is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented for review is as follows: Whether the officer's level-two traffic 
stop was unlawful where it was based only on a computer check that revealed a lack of 
insurance; also, whether the officer exceeded the scope of the detention when he 
continued the traffic stop for a canine drug search without reasonable suspicion to 
support the continued detention and search. 
Standard of Review: The standard applicable here is bifurcated. "The factual 
findings of a trial court that underlie its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress 
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will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous." State v. Davis, 821 P.2d 9, 11 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, 
where the appellate court "decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to 
the trial judge's determination of law." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), 
abrogated on other grounds as recognized in Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co, 
2001 UT 89,1fl3, 65 P.3d 1134; see also State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 15, 103 P.3d 699 
(stating that in the search and seizure context, the appellate court will apply a non-
deferential standard to the trial court's application of the law to the underlying facts). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The issue on appeal is preserved in the record at 42-48, and 158. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions are relevant to the issue on appeal and set forth at 
Addendum B: U.S. Const, amend. IV; Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-303.2 (2005). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below 
On April 1, 2003, the state charged Biggs with one count of unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (2002); and one count of unlawful possession of paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor offense under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (2002). (R. 1-3). 
On April 6, 2004, the trial court conducted a preliminary hearing. (R. 159). The 
state then amended the information to increase the possession charge to a second degree 
felony offense. (R. 19-21). The misdemeanor charge remained the same. (Id.) 
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On January 12, 2005, the defense filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained in 
violation of statutory and constitutional law. (R. 42-69). The defense argued that Biggs 
was a passenger and the owner of a car that was stopped by Officer Sanders for no 
insurance. (R. 42-43). According to the defense, Sanders violated Biggs1 Fourth 
Amendment rights during the traffic stop. (R. 42-47). 
Specifically, after stopping the car, Sanders failed to engage in any investigation 
relating to the basis for the stop: he failed to "look[] up insurance information on Ms. 
Biggs or Ms. Tate [the driver], or otherwise engag[e] in conduct that would dispel or 
confirm his suspicions" regarding that issue. (R. 43). Rather, after initiating the stop and 
determining that the car was not stolen, Sanders then prompted a canine search of the car. 
(R. 43). When the dog indicated on the exterior of the vehicle, the officers initiated a 
search of the interior. The dog indicated there as well. (R. 43). The officers 
subsequently discovered controlled substance and paraphernalia in an area where Biggs 
was sitting and they ran a warrants check on Tate and Biggs. (R. 43). 
Based on those events, the defense argued that under the law, a detention "which 
exceeds the scope of the initial purpose of the stop fmust be supported by reasonable 
suspicion of more serious criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion means suspicion based 
on specific, articulable facts drawn from the totality of the circumstances facing the 
Deputy at the time of the stop.1" (R. 45 (citing, inter alia, State v. Chevre, 2000 UT App 
6,fl0, 994 P.2d 1278)). 
The defense maintained in the motion to suppress that the officer's encounter with 
Biggs was not justified at the outset (R. 45-47) and the officer exceeded the scope of the 
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stop after his investigation failed to prove that the car was stolen. (R. 47); see also Utah 
R. Crim. P. 12(d) (2005) (stating that a motion to suppress shall specify sufficient legal 
and factual grounds to give the opposing party reasonable notice of the issues), The 
defense attached a copy of the preliminary hearing transcript to the motion (see R. 49-
69), and reserved the opportunity to supplement the argument in the motion if additional 
facts were presented at a hearing on the motion to suppress. (See R. 48). 
Thereafter, on February 25, 2005, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing (R. 
78-79, 158). There, the state relied on Sanders' testimony from the preliminary hearing 
as it related to the particular circumstances of this case, and it presented new testimony 
concerning the operation of a computer database in the State of Utah for vehicle 
insurance. (R. 158:5-21). Where the state's new evidence addressed only the insurance 
database, the defense responded at the hearing to that issue. (R. 158:22-30). The trial 
court then ruled, rejecting the arguments raised by the defense in connection with the 
motion to suppress. (R. 158:34-37; see R. 94). 
On April 26, 2005, Biggs entered into a conditional guilty plea, wherein she pled 
guilty to one count of attempted possession of a controlled substance, a class A misde-
meanor offense, and she specifically reserved the right to challenge on appeal the trial 
court's ruling on the motion to suppress. (See R. 87-93 (also indicating a guilty plea in a 
separate Case No. 031101125); 103-04; 160). In connection with the plea, the state 
dismissed the second count against Biggs for possession of drug paraphernalia. (R. 90). 
On April 26, 2005, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
and an order on the matters raised in the evidentiary hearing and on the motion to 
4 
suppress. (R. 94-99). The findings, conclusions and order are attached as Addendum C. 
On October 26, 2005, the trial court sentenced Biggs to a suspended jail term. (R. 
118; 123-24). On November 18, 2005, the defense filed a notice of appeal. (R. 125). 
Due to a probation violation, Biggs is currently incarcerated at the Salt Lake County Jail. 
(R, 155). Her appeal from the final judgment is proper and timely. Utah R. Crim. P. 
1 l(i); Utah R. App. P. 4(a) (2005). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following evidence was presented in this case: On February 17, 2003, Officer 
Wade Sanders of the West Valley Police Department (R. 159:3-4) was patrolling in the 
area of 2450 South 3200 West when he determined to run computer checks (see R. 158: 
18) on a car that he was following. (R. 159:4). Sanders testified that it is his practice to 
run such checks prior to stopping a vehicle to determine if the vehicle is properly regis-
tered, "to verify the plate as matching that particular vehicle," to make sure the vehicle is 
not listed as stolen, and to determine "whether or not the vehicle is insured, et cetera, 
depending on the - what kind of- different information." (R. 158:18; 159:13). 
According to Sanders, in this particular instance, the computer check "showed that 
there was no insurance" on the vehicle. (R. 158:18). Thus, he initiated a traffic stop, and 
he "made contact with the driver," Tiana Tate. (See R. 159:4). Sanders testified that 
there was also a passenger in the vehicle: Toni Biggs. (R. 159:4). 
As Sanders made contact with the driver, he noticed that "the ignition column and 
steering column of the vehicle [were badly] damaged." (R. 159:5). Sanders testified that 
these are "indications of a possible stolen vehicle"; when people steal vehicles, "they will 
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cause damage" to the steering column "so they can start the vehicle and drive off." (Id.) 
Sanders already knew who the registered owner of the vehicle was because he had 
run the statewide computer check before the stop: it was Biggs. (See R. 159:13; see also 
159:8-9). Also, based on his computer check, he would have known that at present, the 
vehicle was not listed as stolen. (See R. 158:18, 159:13). 
Nevertheless, due to the damage to the steering column, Sanders wanted 
confirmation on ownership (see R. 159:13-14), so he asked. (R. 159:5). According to 
Sanders, although Biggs did not have her registration paperwork in the vehicle (R. 159:5, 
13), the vehicle occupants "indicated" that she owned the car, and Biggs did "verify the 
validity of the statement": "it was her." (R. 159:5). Also, Sanders testified that the 
information he received on ownership was consistent with what he knew from the 
computer check. (R. 159:13-14). 
Sanders then stated that "[a]fter [he] was making sure that the vehicle was not a -
still listed as stolen, or stolen at all," he had a second officer from a canine unit conduct a 
"drug sniff of the vehicle." (R. 159:5-6). During the search, the dog alerted or indicated 
on the exterior of the car. (R. 159:6). Based on that indication, the officers had the dog 
enter the car for an interior sniff. (R. 159:6). 
There, the dog indicated "on several different spots," including a black purse and 
camera case in the area where Biggs was sitting. (R. 159:6). Sanders searched the purse 
and found three syringes, a spoon with visible residue, and three small baggies, one of 
which contained white crystallized substance that field-tested positive for methampheta-
mine. (R. 159: 6-7, 11). The substance was submitted to the lab for further confirmation. 
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(See R, 159:7-8). Also, the residue on the spoon was consistent with methamphetamine 
residue that Sanders had seen in other cases. (R. 159:7-8). Sanders discovered a 
backpack in the car that belonged to Tate. It contained a syringe. (R. 159:10). 
In searching the bags, Sanders did not recall seeing "identification, any type of 
photograph, any type of identifying information.ft (R. 159:11), He arrested both Biggs 
and Tate. (R, 159:10-12). He also ran warrants checks. (R. 159:13). Since Biggs had an 
outstanding warrant, he took her to jail. (R. 159:11-12, 9). Tate was arrested and cited at 
the scene for possession of paraphernalia (R. 159:10) and then released. (R. 159:11). 
Additional evidence presented in the case concerned the management and availa-
bility of vehicle insurance information. At a motion to suppress hearing, the state called 
Insure-Rite general manager Ken Stuart to testify. He stated that Insure-Rite manages a 
computer program that matches Utah registered vehicle information to insurance records. 
(R. 158:5-6). The program is available for officers to use "24 hours a day, 7 days a 
week" (R. 158:7) during "routine traffic stops." (R. 158:6, 8). Law enforcement officers 
use the program approximately 400,000 times every month. (R. 158:6). 
According to Stuart, when an officer submits a plate or vehicle identification 
number to the program, it responds in one of three ways: "yes", the vehicle is insured; 
"definite no;" or "not found." (R. 158:7-8), The response is based on information that 
insurance carriers provide to Insure-Rite. (R. 158:10). Insurance carriers "report their 
full book of business every month by the 7th of each month." (R. 158:11, 12). 
Stuart testified that if a vehicle comes up as uninsured for three consecutive 
months, Insure-Rite sends a notice to the vehicle owner requiring proof of insurance, and 
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will follow with a second notice if necessary. (R. 158:8). If the owner does not respond 
to the second notice, Insure-Rite forwards the information to the Department of Motor 
Vehicles to revoke registration. (R. 158:8). Also, if Insure-Rite has sent a notice to an 
owner and the owner has not responded, the vehicle is designated as a "definite no." (R. 
158:9). The "not found" designation indicates a "high degree of probability" that the 
vehicle is uninsured, "we just have not sent them the notice yet at the time." (R. 158:9). 
According to the Insure-Rite manager, only 6% of vehicle owners in Utah are 
uninsured: that would include the "definite no" category and the "not found" category. 
(R. 158:10). The manager also claimed a 98% accuracy rate for the program. (R. 158: 
10-11). In actual numbers, that calculation means that of the 400,000 checks that officers 
make every month (R. 158:6), 8,000 per month and 96,000 per year are inaccurate. 
Insure-Rite also records driver's license information for insurance purposes. (R. 
158:15). Indeed, a person may be covered by his/her own operator's policy when driving 
a car (R. 158:13-15). The Insure-Rite program relating to drivers' licenses is separate 
from the program at issue here. (See R. 158:16). The program that Sanders described in 
this case served to match insurance information to plates (see R. 158:18); it did not 
indicate whether a particular driver was otherwise properly insured as an operator since 
that would entail a separate inquiry. (See R. 158:16). Also, when an officer uses the 
Insure-Rite database, it discloses information available only as of the 7th of each month 
forthatcar. (R. 158:16; see also 158:12). 
In Officer Sander's experience, if the statewide computer system shows no 
insurance for a car, that does not guarantee that the car is uninsured. (R 159:9). Sanders 
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testified that the state code requires a driver "to show proof' of insurance "upon request." 
(R. 158:20). He also testified that he has stopped 200 people for no insurance (R. 
158:19), and 98% were unable to produce paperwork for insurance or they simply 
admitted they had none. (R. 158:20). Sanders reiterated that drivers "are required to 
show proof upon request," and failure to do so "is also a separate offense." (R. 158:21). 
Based on the evidence here, Sanders did not resolve the insurance issue with Tate 
or Biggs. (See R. 158, 159). He did not cite them with "a separate offense" for failing "to 
show proof1 of insurance upon request (quoting R. 158:21; see also R. 1-3, 19-21 ). 
Biggs maintains that based on the facts, the search in this case was unconstitu-
tional and required suppression of the drug and paraphernalia evidence. (R. 42-48). The 
trial court disagreed. (R. 94-99). Biggs entered a conditional guilty plea here to one 
count of attempted possession of a controlled substance. (R. 87-93 (also indicating a 
guilty plea in a separate matter, Case No. 031101125)). She specifically reserved the 
right to appeal the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. (R. 87, 88, 89). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The law permits a level-two detention if an officer articulates objective facts to 
support a reasonable suspicion that the person detained has engaged in criminal activity. 
Here, the trial court ruled that the officer was justified in conducting a detention of the 
occupants of a vehicle based on information from a computer program that the vehicle 
was uninsured. However, Utah law provides that a person driving a vehicle may be 
covered by an operator's policy to insure against damages caused by him and arising from 
his use of the car. That is separate from owner's insurance, yet, is a lawful form of cove-
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rage for operating a vehicle. In this case, the computer program the officer used to check 
the vehicle did not provide information about operators1 insurance. Thus, the officer 
based the stop on a hunch or assumption. That is insufficient for a level-two detention. 
In addition, under the law, an officer must confine the scope and duration of a 
level-two stop to the circumstances that justified it in the first place. If an officer 
continues a detention beyond the original justification for the stop, he must articulate 
additional reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity to support the continued 
detention. In this case, the officer exceeded the scope of the justification for the stop. 
Specifically, the officer failed to tailor the scope of the stop to the insurance issue. 
According to the state's evidence, after the officer conducted the stop and made contact 
with the vehicle occupants, he confirmed ownership, then detained the occupants for a 
canine drug sniff and subsequent search. The detention for the drug sniff wets unjustified. 
Thus, the subsequent search cannot be upheld. The trial court erred in denying the motion 
to suppress. This Court should reverse the trial court's ruling in the matter. 
ARGUMENT 
THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN THIS CASE WERE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN CONNECTION 
WITH THE SEARCH MUST BE SUPPRESSED. 
A. THE LAW REQUIRES AN OFFICER TO LIMIT A SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING IT IN THE FIRST 
PLACE; IF AN OFFICER EXTENDS A SEARCH TO CIRCUMSTANCES 
BEYOND THE ORIGINAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STOP, THE OFFICER 
MUST ARTICULATE ADDITIONAL REASONABLE SUSPICION TO 
SUPPORT THE CONTINUED DETENTION. 
The Fourth Amendment provides the following: 
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and parti-
cularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. Its protections "extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or 
vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest." U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). 
An investigatory stop of a vehicle is otherwise known as a "level-two" stop or 
detention,1 In order to justify a level-two detention, the officer must articulate a 
reasonable suspicion that the person being detained has committed or is committing a 
crime. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ [35, 63 P.3d 650 (stating that when specific 
and articulable facts support a reasonable suspicion that defendant "has or is committing 
a crime" an officer may initiate an investigative detention); see also State v. Chapman, 
921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1996); State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 764 (Utah 1991); Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10, 20-22 (1968); Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (2003). 
The state must present "specific and articulable facts and rational inferences" to 
support reasonable suspicion for the level-two detention. U.S. v. Werking, 915 F.2d 
1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1990). Such a detention cannot be based merely on a hunch. See 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 27. On the other hand, the reasonable suspicion standard is not so 
1 Utah courts have articulated three levels of police-citizen encounters. A level-one 
encounter between a citizen and police is consensual where the citizen is free to leave at 
any time. Since the encounter is consensual, it does not require justification under the 
Fourth Amendment. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ 34, 63 P.3d 650. A level-two 
encounter involves a brief investigative detention. It must be supported by reasonable 
suspicion that defendant has committed or is in the act of committing a crime. See id. at 
^35; see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (2003); State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 450 
(Utah 1996). A level-three encounter involves an arrest. It requires probable cause. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f36. 
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rigid that it requires an officer to "rule out the possibility of innocent conduct." Arvizu, 
534 U.S. at 277. The standard is met even where the "the likelihood of criminal activity" 
does not rise to the level of probable cause. IdL at 274. 
Utah law provides that once a traffic stop based in reasonable suspicion is made, 
"the detention 'must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop.1" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (quoting Florida 
v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)); Chapman, 921 P.2d at 452. Both the "length and 
[the] scope of the detention must be 'strictly tied to and justified byf the circumstances 
which rendered its initiation permissible." Johnson, 805 P.2d at 763 (quoting Terry, 392 
U.S. at 19-20); Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132; see also Chapman, 921 P.2d at 452. 
In that regard, where a traffic stop has occurred, a court will ask, "(1) Was the 
police officer's action 'justified at its inception5? and (2) Was the resulting detention 
'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first 
place?5" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131-32 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20); Hansen, 2002 UT 
125, Tf29; see State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 702 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Finally, if a level-two seizure or detention continues beyond the scope of the initial 
justification for the stop, it may be upheld "only if the officers had a reason, independent 
of the [initial justification], to do so.55 Chapman, 921 P.2d at 453. A detention that 
otherwise exceeds the scope of the justification for the stop is impermissible. See e.g. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at f32; Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1135; Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 ("good 
faith55 on the part of the arresting officer is not enough). At the point where the officer's 
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reasonable suspicions are allayed, the officer is required to allow the detainee to leave. 
See Chapman, 921 P.2d at 452. "Unsupported by further probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion, inquiries by the officer to investigate suspicions unrelated to the traffic offense 
unconstitutionally extend the detention beyond the scope of the circumstances that 
rendered it permissible." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1135. 
Utah courts have applied the principles identified above in assessing the validity 
and scope of a level-two detention in several cases. In the following cases, the defendant 
was a passenger in a vehicle during the detention. 
In State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, an officer stopped a driver for faulty brake 
lights. The officer requested identification from the driver and the defendant/passenger 
in the car. Id. at 762. Defendant denied having identification, but gave the officer her 
name and date of birth. Id, The officer determined that neither occupant owned the car. 
He requested a registration, which the driver could not produce. Id, The officer reasoned 
that "there was a possibility that the car had been stolen." Id He did not ask either of 
them who owned the car. Id. at 762. Instead, the officer conducted a warrants check on 
both persons. Id at 762. The officer "expected [the occupants] to wait for him and 
remain in their car" while he ran the checks. Id 
"The check revealed that the driver had a suspended driver's license and that 
defendant had outstanding warrants." Id The officer arrested defendant and discovered 
drug paraphernalia, among other things, during a search. Id On appeal, the Utah 
Supreme Court ruled that the detention of the passenger for the warrants check 
constituted an unlawful level-two seizure. It lacked reasonable suspicion: "the leap from 
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asking for the passenger's name and date of birth to running a warrants check on her 
severed the chain of rational inference from specific and articulable facts and degenerated 
into an attempt to support an as yet 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 
"hunch."5" Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). 
Next, in State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, an officer observed a Jeep Wagoneer on 
school property after hours and in violation of a loitering ordinance. See id at 448, 451. 
The officer approached the vehicle and requested identification from a young woman (the 
owner) and Chapman, who were both sitting in the back seat. Id. at 448. When the 
officer transmitted the identification information for a warrants and driver's license 
check, a second officer reported to the first that Chapman was an alleged gang member 
and he was known to carry a gun. Id The second officer then joined the first officer at 
the school property. 
[The officers] told Chapman about the information concerning his alleged gang 
membership and likely gun possession. They then conducted a pat-down [Terry] 
search and found no weapon. When asked if he was armed, Chapman replied that 
he was not carrying a gun, but at some point he conceded that he did have a gun in 
a small pack under the front seat of the car. The [arrest] warrants check ultimately 
came back negative. 
Id. The officers obtained permission to search the vehicle and when they located the gun, 
they found it had no bullet in the chamber and its presence in the vehicle was lawful. Id. 
An officer then ran an NCIC stolen weapons check on the gun. Id. at 449. The check 
revealed that the gun was stolen. Id. Chapman was subsequently charged with burglary 
and two counts of theft. Id at 449. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence. Id. The 
trial court denied it. Chapman then appealed. Id. On review to the supreme court, he 
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argued, among other things, that the officers exceeded the scope of the original 
justification for the stop. Id at 449. The supreme court agreed. 
In its analysis, it determined that the officers were justified in their initial 
investigation where they had reasonable suspicion to believe that Chapman was violating 
a loitering ordinance. Id at 451. "[W]e hold that the trial court did not err in concluding 
that Officer Rasmussen had reasonable suspicion to believe that Chapman was violating 
the ordinance, and was justified in initially detaining him." Id. 
The court then considered whether the detention was reasonably related in length 
and scope to the circumstances that rendered its initiation permissible. Id at 452. Also, 
it stated that any continued detention "would be justified only if the officers had a reason, 
independent of the loitering ordinance," to further detain Chapman. Id. at 453. 
The state argued the officers were justified in further detention where they 
reasonably suspected that Chapman had committed or was about to commit another 
offense, and/or the continued detention and search related to a Terry weapons 
frisk/search. Id at 453. The supreme court was not persuaded. It stated, 
After receiving the report that Chapman was known to carry a weapon, the officer 
was certainly entitled to follow ordinary safety procedures to protect himself. This 
may have included waiting for a back-up officer to arrive, asking Chapman to step 
out of the vehicle, and even questioning him about being armed. Once Chapman 
was outside of the vehicle and known to be unarmed, however, the officers had no 
reasonable, articulable suspicion either to continue questioning him regarding 
weapons or to search for them. 
Id. It also stated, 
Officer Rasmussen testified that Chapman said he had a gun inside the vehicle 
when he was initially questioned about being armed. Assuming that this is 
accurate, the officers were justified in searching for the weapon to insure that the 
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weapon was not being carried illegally (i.e., loaded). See Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-502 (1994). However, once that determination was made, the officers had 
no reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify running a check on the weapon to 
see if the weapon had been stolen. By the officers' own testimony, no independent 
facts surrounding the encounter with Chapman created suspicion that he was 
involved in any illegal activity beyond violating the loitering ordinance. Therefore, 
the officers impermissibly expanded the scope of Chapman's detention when they 
ran the additional check on the gun to determine its ownership. 
Id. The court also considered whether continued detention was appropriate where 
Chapman's answers to the officers' questions were inconsistent with other facts: 
If we assume, for purposes of analysis, that the testimony of Chapman's [young 
female] companion is true, that Chapman indicated he had no weapon when 
originally questioned by the officers but admitted to possessing a gun in the 
vehicle only after continued questioning, then even the officers' additional 
interrogation of Chapman would have been beyond the scope of his detention for 
violation of the loitering ordinance. 
Id. at 454. Specifically, once officers had answers to their questions, they were required 
to end the detention: "Unless other factors independently suggested to the officers that 
the weapon was stolen, such a search would not permit the officers to continue to expand 
Chapman's detention to run an NCIC check." Id. at 454. The continued detention for 
that purpose was unlawful. Id.; see also Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^[32. 
In another case, State v. Hansen, 837 P.2d 987 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), this Court 
found a continued detention to be unlawful. There, deputies stopped "Blue" based on a 
suspicion that she was driving under the influence of alcohol. Id at 987. The deputies 
concluded she was not legally drunk, but determined she should not drive. Id. A deputy 
asked if defendant, the passenger, could drive and Blue agreed. Id, 
The deputy approached defendant and "without any explanation" requested that 
she produce a driver's license, which she claimed she did not have. Id. at 988. The 
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deputy then asked for her name and date of birth, and he proceeded to run a license and 
warrants check. Id at 988. The check revealed outstanding warrants. Id "Accordingly, 
the officers arrested [defendant], and during a search incident to the arrest, discovered 
marijuana in her fanny pack." Id. This Court ruled that officers completed the purpose 
of the stop when they determined that Blue was not legally drunk. Id at 989. The 
subsequent detention, which consisted of asking defendant's name and running a check, 
constituted a seizure of defendant without reasonable articulable suspicion, in violation of 
the constitution. Id at 988-89. 
The cases identified above are relevant here. The issue in Biggs' case concerns the 
original justification for the stop, and Sanders1 actions thereafter. Specifically, Biggs 
maintained in the trial court that where a pre-stop computer inquiry indicated that the car 
was uninsured, that was not sufficient basis for initiating a level-two detention. (See R. 
158:22-30). Indeed, no traffic violation occurred in this matter to prompt the computer 
search in the first place. 
Also, once Sanders initiated the stop, he made no attempt to resolve the insurance 
issue with Tate or Biggs. (See R. 43, 45, 47). Rather, Sanders indicated that he had 
concerns that the car might be stolen, and he engaged in an investigation to that end. (R. 
159:5 (stating that when Sanders was making contact with the driver, he observed 
damage to the steering column and looked into that issue)). When Sanders completed 
that investigation to his satisfaction (R. 159:5, 13-14 (he confirmed the car was not stolen 
and "verified] the validity of the statement" that Biggs owned it)), he then further 
detained the occupants for a canine drug sniff. (R. 159:5-6 (stating that "after" making 
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sure the vehicle was not stolen, he had a second officer conduct a drug sniff)). The 
further detention was unlawful. Thus, the fruits of the detention and the subsequent 
search must be suppressed. See Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764. 
In reviewing the reasonable-suspicion / detention issue in this case, this Court will 
begin with the findings of fact. Where the trial court has made findings regarding the 
facts, this Court will uphold them unless the appellant is able to demonstrate through the 
marshaled evidence that they are unsupportable or clearly erroneous. See e.g. State v. 
Davis, 821 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Also, "[a]s long as the underlying facts, and reasonable inferences drawn from 
those facts, justify the conclusion that reasonable suspicion existed" to support the 
officer's conduct, State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26,1J19, 112 P.3d 507, the Fourth 
Amendment is satisfied. Indeed, this Court must "judge the officer's conduct in light of 
common sense and ordinary human experience and . . . accord deference to an officer's 
ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions." Markland, 2005 UT 26 
at Tf 11 (ellipsis in original; cites omitted). Further, this Court must view the facts 
presented in "their totality and avoid the temptation to divide the facts and evaluate them 
in isolation from each other." State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, Tfl4, 78 P.3d 590. 
Since the officer engaged in a search and seizure here without a warrant, the state 
carries the burden of demonstrating that the conduct was justified and lawful each step of 
the way. See State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411-12 (Utah 1984) (ruling that "[s]ince 
the officers had no warrant, it was the burden of the State to show that the search was 
lawful"; also since the state presented no evidence regarding the matter, the discovered 
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container would be suppressed); see also U.S. v. Carhee, 27 F.3d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 
1994) (stating that the government bears the burden of proving that its warrantless actions 
were justified); U.S. v. Roch, 5 F.3d 894, 897 (5th Cir. 1993). 
This burden under the Fourth Amendment does not demand rigid formalities; 
however, it does require some evidence to support the police action. See e.g. Markland, 
2005 UT 26 at f^ 10 (stating that the state's burden "need not rise to the level required for 
probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the 
evidence standard11 (citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274)). 
If the state's evidence is wholly lacking in the matter, no reasonable inference may 
be drawn therefrom. See Christensen, 676 P.2d at 411, 412 (where the state elicited no 
testimony as to whether the officers searched a container under the open-view doctrine, 
the container would be suppressed). Also, where the state has failed to present evidence 
to support reasonable suspicion during the course of the detention, the fruits of the 
officer's investigation must be suppressed. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 
(Utah 1991); Hansen, 837 P.2d at 989 (defendant was unlawfully seized when officers 
ran warrants check; matter remanded for proceedings consistent with opinion). 
Based on the above standards, and as further explained herein, the state failed to 
carry its burden of proof. It failed to present evidence of reasonable suspicion to support 
the detention and search. Thus, the fruits of the investigation should be suppressed. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED THE LEVEL-TWO STOP TO BE 
JUSTIFIED WHERE SANDERS DETERMINED THROUGH A COMPUTER 
CHECK THAT THE CAR WAS UNINSURED; THAT DOES NOT JUSTIFY 
DETAINING BIGGS OR THE SEARCH THAT WAS ULTIMATELY 
CONDUCTED IN THIS MATTER. 
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1. The First Question Under Lopez Concerns the Justification for the Slop. Here, 
the Computer Check Did Not Justify a Level-Two Detention, 
(a). The Findings of Fact. 
In connection with the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court executed 
state-drafted "findings of fact." (See R. 96-98). Under the law, this Court will not disturb 
a trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Davis, 821 P.2d at 1L 
While the facts will be construed in the light most favorable to the findings, this 
Court nevertheless will "review the facts in detail." State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 766 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). "A finding not supported by substantial, competent evidence must 
be rejected." State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990); 50 West Broadway 
Associates v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah 
1989) ("A trial court's findings cannot be made up out of whole cloth; substantial, 
competent evidence must exist that supports the findings, and when a finding of fact is 
not so supported, it must be rejected"). 
Also, this Court is "not bound by the trial court's classification of a finding of fact 
or a conclusion of law; we will make that classification ourselves." 50 West Broadway 
Associates, 784 P.2d at 1171; Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 916 P.2d 344, 
354 (Utah 1996) (stating that the first question is "whether the challenged findings are 
appropriately deemed findings of fact. A finding is not necessarily a finding of fact 
simply because a tribunal says it is. A factual finding may be contrary to law and must 
therefore be stricken even if it is supported by substantial evidence"). 
In this case, some of the "findings" are more appropriately classified as 
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propositions of law or legal conclusions. For example, the trial court's "finding" number 
1 states, "the first determination that must be made when analyzing a search and seizure 
issue arising out of a traffic stop is whether the peace officer's actions were justified at 
the inception of the stop." (R. 96,11). That finding is not based in "facts" or inferences 
presented by the witnesses in this case. (See R. 158:5-21; 159:3-14). It is a legal 
proposition. See Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131-32 (stating that under the law, where a traffic 
stop has occurred, a court will first ask whether the officer's actions were justified at 
inception). Thus, finding number 1 should not be treated as a finding of fact. 
Also, "finding" number 2 states: 
The Court finds that the traffic stop of the Defendant was justified at its inception. 
The Court finds that a peace officer that has reasonable suspicion that a driver is 
operating a vehicle without insurance is justified in stopping that vehicle. The 
peace officer is not required to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the driver 
does not have insurance on the vehicle. In support of its findings, the Court noted 
that in fState v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, pOJ the Utah Supreme Court found that 
an officer was justified in making an initial traffic stop was reasonable [sic] when 
he observed Mr. Hansen make an improper lane change and was suspected of 
driving without insurance. The Court also noted that an officer is justified in 
stopping a driver for a defective taillight. So driving without insurance is a 
sufficient basis for a vehicle stop. 
(R. 97, ^ [2). That finding is more appropriately classified as a conclusion of law. 
Specifically, in this case, neither Sanders nor Stuart testified to the law for the 
reasonable-suspicion standard and a vehicle operating without insurance. (See R. 158:5-
21; 159:3-14). Likewise, neither Sanders nor Stuart provided testimony concerning defec-
tive taillights, or the supreme court's decision in Hansen. (See R. 158:5-21; 159:3-14). 
Thus, with respect to "finding" number 2, whether the officer was justified in 
conducting a traffic stop under the circumstances is a question of law that this Court may 
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decide without deference to the trial court. Chapman, 921 P.2d at 450 ("[W]hether a 
particular set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a question of law, which is 
reviewed for correctness"); see also State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 15, 103 P.3d 699. 
Next, the trial court here made the following additional "findings" in connection 
with the motion to suppress. It found that Stuart was credible. Also, in 1995, the 
legislature determined that Utah had a problem with uninsured motorists: "approximately 
23% of vehicles were uninsured." (See R. 97, [^3). Also, uninsured motorists "have been 
a serious problem in light of the number of traffic accidents and resulting injuries. The 
victims of uninsured motorists are placed in a precarious position." (R. 97, f3). 
The court found that the "development of the Uninsured Motorists Identification 
Database Program and attendant laws and regulations have been very effective in 
reducing the number of uninsured vehicles." (R. 97, ^  4). "[Approximately 94% of all 
vehicles in Utah are now insured." (Id.) According to the findings, "there is a significant 
public policy interest in having peace officers check whether or not a vehicle is insured. 
If a motorist drives a vehicle that is not insured, and the driver is not otherwise insured, 
an accident can absolutely devastate the life of the victim of the accident. For instance, if 
an accident caused by an uninsured vehicle and motorist results in another's death or 
serious bodily injury, the victim or his family is left in a tremendously difficult position." 
(R. 97, TJ5). The findings relating to vehicle insurance focused on public safety and the 
need for insurance coverage in the event of an accident. (See R. 97, *|fl[3-5). 
The trial court also determined that "the Utah State Legislature wants peace 
officers to ensure that vehicles are insured and [it has] set up the Uninsured Motorists 
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Identification Database Program to enable that end." (R. 97, |6) . Also, "it is a standard 
procedure for peace officers to check for insurance on vehicles." (R. 97, ^6).2 
In this case, the trial court found that "Officer Sanders checked the Uninsured 
Motorists Identification Database Program. The Uninsured Motorists Identification 
Database indicated that the vehicle [Tate was driving] was not insured." (R. 97, \1 (also, 
the court found that Sander was credible)). The trial court considered the "showing of no 
insurance" to be the basis for the traffic stop. (R. 97, f 7). Indeed, the marshaled 
evidence reflects that Sanders conducted a computer check of the car that Tate was 
driving and he determined that the vehicle was not insured. (See R. 159:4). Based on 
that information, Sanders initiated a traffic stop. (Id.) 
Also, the record supports that Insure-Rite maintains insurance data and makes it 
available to officers for use during "routine traffic stops." (R. 158:6-8). Insure-Rite's 
information is based on information provided by carriers before the 7th of each month; 
and Insure-Rite considers its program to be 98% accurate. (R. 158:10-11, 16). Biggs 
does not challenge those portions of finding number 7 supported by the record. 
With respect to the remaining parts of "finding" number 7, the trial court 
determined that a showing in the computer database of no insurance on a car supported 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. (R. 98, f7). Also, "Officer Sanders rightfully 
conducted a stop of the vehicle based upon his reasonable and articulable suspicion that 
2 A standard procedure is not necessarily a lawful procedure. For example, if officers 
made it a standard practice or procedure to barge into homes to conduct a search without 
a warrant and without probable cause and exigent circumstances, that standard procedure 
would be unlawful. 
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the vehicle was not insured" (R. 98, \ 7 (emphasis added)). Those portions of "finding" 
number 7 do not qualify as factual findings. They do not purport to identify any 
particular fact or circumstance presented in evidence in this case. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 
935 (stating that factual questions entail events, actions, or conditions happening, 
existing, or taking place, as well as state of mind). Rather, the language purports to 
sanction Sanders' conduct as lawful or "rightful[]" and based in "reasonable[]articulable 
suspicion." Those portions of "finding" number 7 are more properly classified as 
conclusions of law. Chapman, 921 P.2d at 450 (stating that whether a particular set of 
facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a question of law). 
The trial court also found that "society's interest in protecting victims from 
uninsured vehicles overwhelmingly outweighs the inconvenience to an individual of 
being stopped by an officer who finds the vehicle to be coded as uninsured on Ihe Unin-
sured Motorists Identification Database." (R. 98, f 8). That "finding" appears to articulate 
a legal proposition. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-22. 
Specifically, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that society has an 
interest in having suspicious criminal activity investigated. See id. The Supreme Court 
has balanced society's interest in effective crime prevention and detection against the 
sanctity of the individual to go about his business without interference from government 
agents. See id.; see also id. at 23-24 (further identifying a governmental interest in 
ensuring that the person with whom an officer is dealing is not armed with a weapon, and 
balancing that interest against intrusions on individual rights). To that end, the Court has 
specified that an officer is justified in conducting a level-two detention or stop for 
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purposes of investigation if he is able to "point to specific and articulable facts which, 
taken together with rational inferences from those facts," support a belief that the person 
he has stopped has committed or is committing a crime. Id at 21; Chapman, 921 P.2d at 
450; Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (2003). The detention must be brief and related in scope 
to the circumstances that justified it in the first place. See Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131-32. 
The balancing approach constitutes legal analysis. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. In 
another context, the U.S. Supreme Court balanced society's interest in having government 
officials engage in inspections or investigations for health and safety reasons against an 
individual's right to be free from governmental intrusion. See Camara v. Municpal Court, 
387 U.S. 523, 535-37, 539 (1967) (stating the analysis considers the governmental 
interest at stake - public health and safety - against the intrusion). The Court recognized 
that such investigations are for the purpose of determining whether an individual is 
complying with safety codes and regulations in his property; they are not aimed at 
discovering evidence of crime (icL at 530) even though most "regulatory laws, fire, 
health, and housing codes are enforced by criminal processes." Id. at 531. 
Based on the interests at stake, the Court determined that in most routine cases for 
safety investigations, "there is no compelling urgency to inspect at a particular time or on 
a particular day," Id. at 539. Thus, where officials are unable to obtain consent for the 
safety inspection, they must establish probable cause for a warrant to justify the intrusion. 
See e.g. id. at 538 (recognizing that the probable-cause standard for a safety inspections 
warrant is more general and less demanding than the probable-cause standard for a 
criminal investigations warrant); see also State v. Cornwall, 810 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah Ct. 
25 
App. 1991) (recognizing a legal analysis that balances the need to search against the 
invasion which the search entails; and stating that a warrantless administrative search 
conducted for safety reasons must be "narrowly tailored" in scope). 
Since "finding" number 8 here concerns a balancing approach, that is legal 
analysis, and may be reviewed as such. See Brake, 2004 UT 95, ^[15. 
Finally, the trial court in this case found that "the Defendants [sic] motion to 
suppress should be denied as the officer's stop was justified at its inception." (R. 98, ^|9). 
That finding is more properly classified as a conclusion of law on the motion to suppress. 
See Chapman, 921 P.2d at 450 (stating that whether a particular set of facts gives rise to 
reasonable suspicion is a question of law). 
Biggs does not challenge findings 3 through 6 (R. 97), or those portions of finding 
7 that concern Stuart's and Sanders' testimony. (See supra, pages 22-23, herein). She 
challenges the trial court's application of the law to this case, the legal analysis and 
conclusions. Biggs maintains that the state's evidence fails to support reasonable 
suspicion for the stop, it fails to support a justification for the continued detention, and it 
fails to support a justification for the search for drugs. Since those matters concern 
questions of law, see Chapman, 921 P.2d at 450, this Court will determine them without 
deference to the trial court. See Brake, 2004 UT 95, 1J15. 
(b) Application of the Law to the Facts in this Case. 
Under Utah law, a traffic stop is always a level-two or a level-three encounter. 
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)); 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ |28 ("[SJtopping an automobile and detaining its occupants 
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constitute a 'seizure1 within the meaning of [the Fourth] Amendment^, even though the 
purpose of the top is limited and the resulting detention quite brief) (quoting Delaware v. 
Prouse). "[A] police officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if the stop is 
'incident to a traffic violation committed in the officers' presence.'" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 
1132 (cites omitted). 
Traffic violations are defined in Utah statutory law at Title 41, Chapter 6a of the 
Motor Vehicles Traffic Code. Under those provisions, a peace officer is defined as an 
officer authorized to "direct or regulate traffic or to make arrests for violations of traffic 
laws." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-102(40) (2005); see also State v. Martinez, 2006 UT 
App 76, 546 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (recognizing that officers may make arrests for 
misdemeanor traffic violations). 
A violation of a Utah traffic law may include speeding (see Utah Code Ann. §§ 
41-6a-209, 41-6a-601, et. seq. (2005)), failing to respond to an officer's signal to stop (id. 
at § 41-6a-210 (2005)), driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or reckless 
driving (id, §§ 41-6a-501, et, seq. (2005)), improperly changing lanes or overtaking or 
passing vehicles, or failing to yield to certain traffic or pedestrians (id §§ 41-6a-701, et. 
seq.; 41-6a-801, et. seq.; 41-6a-901, et. seq.\ 41-6a-1001, et. seq. (2005)), or improperly 
operating or equipping a vehicle. Id. at §§ 41 -6a-1604, et. seq. (2005). 
3 Although the encounter in this case occurred in 2003, this Brief relies on the most 
recent version of the Motor Vehicles Traffic Code; amendments to that code are not 
relevant here. 
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Lack of vehicle insurance is not a violation of the Utah traffic laws. The vehicle 
insurance provisions are found in the Insurance Code. According to the Insurance Code,4 
a policy for motor vehicle insurance may be purchased by a person as an owner or an 
operator. An "operator's policy" names the operator/driver as the insured (see Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(l)(a) (2005)) and it insures the operator against "loss from the 
liability imposed upon him by law for damages arising out of the [operator's/] insured's 
use of any motor vehicle not owned by him." Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-303(l)(a)(ii)(B). 
Under the law, the "operator's policy" subjects the operator of a car to the same liability 
limits as an owner's policy. Id (with references to Utah Code Ann. §§ 31 A-22-302(l)(a), 
and-304). 
Next, according to the "Financial Responsibility of Motor Vehicle Owners and 
Operators Act" (hereinafter the "Financial Responsibility Act"), an owner of a vehicle is 
required to maintain "owner's or operator's vehicle security in effect at any time" the 
vehicle is operated on a highway, quasi-public road, or parking area in the State. Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-12a-301(2)(a) (2005) (emphasis added);5 see also Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-22-303(l)(a)(ii)(B) (providing for an operator's policy). "Owner's or operator's 
security" is defined as an insurance policy or combination of policies conforming to the 
4 Although the encounter here occurred in 2003, this Brief relies on the most recent 
version of the Insurance Code; amendments to that code are not relevant here. 
5 Although the encounter occurred in 2003, this Brief relies on the most recent version 
of the Financial Responsibility Act; amendments to that act are not relevant here. 
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Insurance Code (Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302) and issued by an insurer authorized to 
do business in Utah. Utah Code Ann. §41-12a-103(9) (2005). 
The Financial Responsibility Act requires owners or operators of a vehicle to be 
insured or to risk penalty for lack of insurance. 
(1) Any owner of a motor vehicle on which owner's or operator's security is 
required under Section 41-12a-301, who operates his vehicle or permits it to be 
operated on a highway in this state without owner's security being in effect is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor, and the fine shall be not less than: 
(a) $400 for a first offense; and 
(b) $ 1,000 for a second and subsequent offense within three years of a 
previous conviction or bail forfeiture. 
(2)(a) Except as provided under Subsection (2)(b), any other person who operates 
a motor vehicle upon a highway in Utah with the knowledge that the owner does 
not have owner's security in effect for the motor vehicle is also guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor, and the fine shall be not less than: 
(i) $400 for a first offense; and 
(ii) $ 1,000 for a second and subsequent offense within three years of a 
previous conviction or bail forfeiture, 
(b) A person that has in effect owner's security on a Utah-registered motor vehicle 
or its equivalent that covers the operation, by the person, of the motor vehicle in 
question is exempt from this Subsection (2). 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-302 (2005). 
Furthermore, pursuant to the Financial Responsibility Act, a person operating a 
vehicle is required to have in his or her "immediate possession evidence of owner's or 
operator's security for the motor vehicle the person is operating." Utah Code Ann. § 41-
12a-303.2(2)(a)(i)(A). If a peace officer demands evidence of security or insurance, the 
operator of the vehicle is required to "display it." Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-
303.2(2)(a)(i)(B). Thus, Section 41-12a-303.2(2)(a)(i) makes an operator of a vehicle 
primarily responsible for proof of insurance coverage for any vehicle she/he operates. Id 
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Finally, the Uninsured Motorist Identification Database Program ("UMIDP") is 
codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-12a-801, et. seq.6 In this case, an agent for the 
UMIDP, manager Ken Stuart, agreed that in Utah, a person may drive a vehicle with 
operator's insurance, (R. 158:15). Also, Stuart acknowledged that while the UMtDP 
allows an officer to run a computer check on a driver's license number for information on 
a particular driver or operator (see R. 158:7-8; Utah Code Ann. § 41~12a-803(6) (stating 
that the driver's license division shall provide the program agent with information on all 
persons in the driver's license database)), that computer check is separate from the check 
that Sanders ran on the license plate for the stop here. (See R. 158:16, 18). 
Stuart's testimony about the program focused primarily on the database for vehicle 
insurance coverage (see R. 158:7-9, 15-16), while the law allows for insurance coverage 
through an operator. Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-12a-301(2)(a) (stating that a vehicle owner 
shall maintain owner's "or operator's security"); 31A-22-303(l)(a)(i) and (ii)(B) (allowing 
for operator's security). The operator's policy even allows a person to operate a car that 
s/he does not own. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(l)(a)(ii)(B). 
In this case, Sanders initiated a traffic stop because of what he learned from the 
UMIDP about a vehicle. (See R. 159:4; 158:18; 98, f7 (finding that Sanders learned 
through the database that the car was uninsured)). He testified that in his experience, if 
the statewide computer system shows no insurance for a car, that does not guarantee that 
6 Although the encounter in this case occurred in 2003, this Brief relies on the most 
recent version of the provisions governing the UMIDP; amendments there are not 
relevant here. 
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the car is uninsured. (R. 159:9; see also 158:20). Here, Sanders did not observe a traffic 
violation, he did not know Tate, and he ran a computer check only on the vehicle before 
the stop. (R. 159:4, 9). Thus, given the limited inquiry, he had no basis for suspecting 
one way or another that Tate was driving without the insurance permitted by law. See 
e.g. Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-12a-301(2)(a) (stating a vehicle owner shall maintain owner's 
"or operator's security"); 31A-22-303(l)(a)(i), (ii)(B) (allowing for operator's security). 
While the reasonable suspicion standard does not rise to the level of probable 
cause and does not require an officer to "rule out the possibility of innocent conduct," 
Markland, 2005 UT 26, ^ [10 (citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277), it likewise does not permit 
an officer to initiate a level-two detention based on a hunch (see Terry, 392 U.S. at 22), to 
make assumptions about the law, or to disregard what the law allows. See e.g. State v. 
Friesen, 1999 UT App 262,1f1fl3-l6, 988 P.2d 7 (where an officer stopped defendant due 
to an incorrect assumption about the law, he lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop). 
In this case, Sanders knew that the law required the operator of a car to provide 
proof of insurance. (See R. 158:20). That is, while the law makes it unlawful for an 
owner to fail to insure a vehicle, see e.g. Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-302(l), the law allows 
for operator's insurance and it requires the person driving the car to show proof of 
insurance upon the demand of an officer. Utah Code Ann. §§ 31 A-22-303(l)(a)(i) and 
(ii)(B) (allowing for operator's security); 41-12a-301(2)(a) (requiring "owner's or 
operator's security"); 41-12a-303.2(2)(a)(i) (requiring the operator to display owner's or 
operator's security upon the demand of an officer). Indeed, the law allows for an 
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operator to be insured separately from the vehicle. (See R. 158:15-16); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-22-303(l)(a)(i) and(ii)(B). 
The database program that Sanders utilized here did not provide information about 
operator's insurance. (See R. 158:15-16, 18 (Sanders used a program that checked the 
plate of the car; that is a query separate from checking whether a driver/operator is 
insured)). Yet, Utah law allows for such coverage. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-22-
303(l)(a)(ii)(B); 41-12a-301(2)(a). Sander's proceeded with the stop based on limited 
information and a hunch. That is insufficient. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. 
In addition, insurance companies were required to update information on vehicle 
insurance only once a month, by the 7th of each month. (See R. 158:12, 16; see also 
159:3-4 (specifying that the encounter in this case occurred on February 17, 2003)). 
Thus, the computer program here did not necessarily provide contemporaneous or current 
information about vehicle coverage. 
The totality of the circumstances here fails to establish reasonable suspicion for 
the detention. Reasonable suspicion must be based on "specific and articulable facts" 
together with rational inferences, Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, "regarding the conduct of the 
person stopped, not the nature of the law." Friesen, 1999 UT App 262, ^[14. It requires a 
particularized and objective basis that would lead the officer to suspect a person of 
criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level of objective 
justification for detention, something more than an "inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion or 'hunch.'" See Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764. 
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Also, while the people of Utah "have an interest in requiring individuals traveling 
our highways to comply with the law," Friesen, 1999 UT App 262, [^16, such an interest 
does not justify arbitrarily stopping vehicles based on database information about a 
vehicle when Utah law, in fact, allows for the operation of a vehicle with operator's 
insurance. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-22-303(l)(a)(ii)(B) (allowing for an operator's 
policy for use of a vehicle "not owned by him"); 41-12a-301(2)(a). 
The burden is on the state to present facts sufficient to support reasonable 
suspicion. See e.g. Christensen, 676 P.2d at 411. In this case the state failed to support 
the stop with reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the car "had engaged, [were] 
engaged, or [were] about to engage in criminal activity." Markland, 2005 UT 26, ^ fl. 
Thus, the officer's actions were not justified at inception: This Court may reject the trial 
court's "findings" concerning application of the law here. (See R. 96-98, ff 1, 2, 7 
(stating that under the circumstances, the traffic stop was justified and rightfully based on 
reasonable suspicion); 98, ^ | 8 , 9 (stating that the law allows for level-two detentions to 
confirm that vehicles are insured, and denying the motion to suppress)); see also 
Chapman, 921 P.2d at 450 (stating that whether a particular set of facts gives rise to 
reasonable suspicion is a question of law). 
Also, this Court may reject the trial court's "finding" number 2 concerning Hansen, 
2002 UT 125. (See R. 97, ^ 2). That case is distinguishable. Specifically, the defendant 
there did not challenge the initial justification for the stop. See id. at TP-2, 17. Thus, the 
supreme court did not analyze whether a computer check that revealed no insurance was 
itself a sufficient basis for initiating a traffic stop. Id. at ^ 1-3. In addition, the officer 
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in Hansen initiated the level-two detention after he ran the insurance computer check and 
observed defendant make an improper lane change. Id. at 1fl|6-7. An improper lane 
change constitutes a traffic violation for a level-two detention. See id, at ^6 n. 1; see also 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-801 (2005). 
Likewise, this case is distinguishable from a situation where an officer may ob-
serve a defective taillight (Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1604) or improper operating equip-
ment (id at §§ 41-6a-601, et seq), or some other violation of the traffic code. (See supra, 
pages 26-27, herein). Indeed, a traffic violation did not occur here. Thus, the trial court's 
"finding" concerning the defective taillight is irrelevant. (See R. 97, %L). 
M[S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute^] a sei2;ureff 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131 (cites omitted). 
The officer here was required to articulate reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the 
car had committed a crime or were about to engage in criminal activity. In this case, 
Sanders had only an unparticularized hunch when he initiated a stop. The limited 
information available in the context of this case was insufficient for reasonable suspicion. 
This Court may reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress on that basis. 
2. The Second Question Under Lopez Asks Whether the Resulting Detention and 
Search Were Reasonably Related in Scope to the Circumstances that Justified the 
Interference in the First Place. Here, Sanders Exceeded the Scope of the 
Justification for the Stop When He Detained the Occupants for a Canine Drug 
Sniff 
The defense argued in its papers in this case that the detention exceeded the scope 
of the justification for the stop, and the officer made no effort to tailor his investigation to 
the reason for the stop. (R. 42-47). The defense relied in its motion on the testimony of 
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Sanders. (See R. 42-44, 49-69). Sanders1 testimony was attached to the motion and it 
reflected the following: On February 17, 2003, Sanders stopped Tate and Biggs for no 
insurance (R. 42), and after he confirmed ownership of the car, he detained them for a 
canine drug sniff. (R. 43; see supra, pages 5-7, herein). 
The motion sufficiently addressed whether the officer's investigation in this matter 
exceeded the scope of the justification for the stop. (R. 42-47 (citing Hansen, 2002 UT 
125 at ffif 35-37; Johnson, 805 P.2d at 763; Chapman, 921 P.2d at 452; Chevre, 994 P.2d 
at 1281)); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 12(d) (2005) (stating that a motion to suppress shall 
specify sufficient legal and factual grounds to give the opposing party reasonable notice 
of the issues). Indeed, a motion to suppress is like a pleading in that it frames the issues 
and gives opposing counsel notice of the law and the facts in the matter. See e.g. Utah 
R. Crim. P. 12(a). 
Based on the argument presented by the defense, the state was on notice that it was 
required to prove that the continued detention was justified. See Christensen, 676 P.2d at 
411 (ruling that n[s]ince the officers had no warrant, it was the burden of the State to 
show that the search was lawful1'; also where the state presented no evidence regarding 
the matter, the container would be suppressed). 
In this case, the state chose not to present evidence at the motion hearing 
regarding that issue. (See e.g. R. 158 (presenting evidence concerning insurance 
database)). In the motion to suppress hearing, the prosecutor focused only on the Insure-
Rite program and the program's availability to officers in checking vehicle insurance 
information. (See R. 158:5-21). Thus, the state's evidence in this case failed to provide 
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justification for the continued detention and search. 
Specifically, under Utah law, once a traffic stop is made, "the detention 'must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.1" 
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)). Both 
"[t]he length and scope of the detention must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the 
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." Johnson, 805 P.2d at 763 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20). 
An officer may "request a driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a 
computer check, and issue a citation. However, once the driver has produced a valid 
driver's license and evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, 'he must be allowed to 
proceed on his way, without being subjected to further delay by police for additional 
questioning.'" Chapman, 921 P.2d at 452 (cites omitted); Lopez , 873 P.2d at 1132; see 
also Castner, 825 P.2d at 703. 
If the officer extends the detention beyond the original justification for the stop, he 
must articulate additional reasonable suspicion "of more serious criminal activity" to sup-
port the continued detention. See Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132. In that instance, the scope of 
the continued detention is "still limited." Id. The officer must diligently pursue a means 
of investigation that will confirm or dispel the additional suspicions. See State v. Lafond, 
2003 UT App 101, f 14, 68 P.3d 1043. "This limited justification to detain a suspect does 
not give officers carte blanche investigative authority. It must be particularly noted that 
police authority to detain a suspect on reasonable suspicion is a creature of exigency." 
State v. Cushing, 2004 UT App 73, f22, 88 P.3d 368 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). 
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In this case, the state's evidence shows that Sanders initially stopped Tate and 
Biggs for lack of insurance on the vehicle. (R. 159:4). To the extent Sanders was justi-
fied in making a level-two stop for that purpose (but see supra, Argument B. 1., herein), 
he was required to limit the scope of his investigation to the justification for the stop. 
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132. ff[T]he detention 'must be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."' IdL (citing Royer, 460 U.S. at 500), In 
this case, Sanders did not do that. 
Specifically, Sanders testified that once he stopped the car for a purported 
insurance violation, he made contact with the driver (R. 159:4), observed damage to the 
steering column of the car (R. 159:5), and had concerns that it may be stolen. (R. 159:5, 
13-14). Sanders investigated that matter, and confirmed to his satisfaction that Biggs was 
the proper owner. (See R. 159:13 (Sanders already knew that the registered owner was 
Biggs due to the statewide computer check); see also R. 158:18; 159:13 (due to the 
computer check, Sanders would have known that at present, the vehicle was not listed as 
stolen); 159:5, 13-14 (Sanders asked about ownership and Biggs identified herself); 159:5 
(Sanders was satisfied with the validity of ownership: "it was her"); 159:14 (the 
information he received on ownership was consistent with what he knew from the 
computer check)). 
Once Sanders resolved the issue regarding ownership, he was required to turn his 
attention to the insurance issue: "Both the 'length and [the] scope of the detention must be 
"strictly tied to and justified by" the circumstances which rendered its initiation 
permissible.'" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (citing Johnson, 805 P.2d at 763). That means, 
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Sanders could request Tate's driver's license, and if he had access to a computer database, 
he could confirm its validity. Id. Also, he could request proof of insurance coverage (see 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-303.2(2)(a)(i)) or check for any available information in the 
driver's license database. Id. at §§ 41-12a-803(6) (providing for a database that v/ould 
contain driver's license information); 41-12a-301(2)(l) (requiring owner's "or operator's 
security" to be in effect); 31A-22-303(l)(a)(ii)(B) (providing for operator's coverage). 
However, in this case, there is no indication Sanders did that. (See R. 159; 158:17-21). 
Also, under Utah law, if Tate or Biggs were to present proof of owner's or opera-
tor's insurance, that would satisfy the matter. Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-303.2(2)(b), (3). 
Sanders would then be required to allow Tate and Biggs to proceed on their way 
"without being subjected to further delay by police" for any additional investigation. 
Chapman, 921 P.2d at 452 (cites omitted); Lopez , 873 P.2d at 1131-32; Castner. 825 
P.2dat703. 
In this case, Sanders did not proceed in that manner. He delayed any action on the 
insurance issue to detain Tate and Biggs for reasons unrelated to the insurance issue: He 
delayed and detained them for a canine drug sniff. He testified that "[a]fter" he made 
sure the vehicle was not listed as stolen "or stolen at all," he had a second officer from a 
canine unit conduct a "drug sniff of the vehicle." (R. 159:5-6). During the search, the 
dog alerted or indicated on the exterior of the car. (R. 159:6). Based on that indication, 
the officers had the dog enter the car for an interior sniff and the discovery of drugs and 
paraphernalia. (R. 159:6). 
The detention for the canine drug sniff exceeded the scope of the justification for 
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the stop. See Hansen, 2002 UT 125, | f 11 and 32 (where the officer did not recall 
resolving the traffic violation, but instead questioned defendant about alcohol, drugs or 
weapons, "the scope of questioning exceeded, without justification, the purpose of the 
initial traffic stop, [and] the continued encounter was illegal unless some other 
circumstances justified the additional questioning"); see also Chapman, 921 P.2d at 452 
(stating that during a traffic stop, an officer may request a driver's license and vehicle 
registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation; no mention of a canine drug 
sniff); see also People v. Gilbert, 808 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (111. App. Ct. 2004) (stating that 
"a canine sniff or any inquiry about drugs is not related in any way to investigating a 
broken taillight," which was the only justification for the stop), cert, denied, 125 S.Ct. 
1826(2005). 
The canine drug sniff did not relate to any concerns articulated by Sanders in his 
encounter with Tate and Biggs. (See R. 159:3-14; see also 158:17-21). It did not relate 
in any degree to the proof of insurance issue, and it did not relate to ownership of the 
vehicle. (See e.g. R. 159:3-14). Indeed, Sanders had already confirmed ownership when 
he prompted the second unit to engage in the canine drug search. (R. 159:5-6). 
The leap in this case from stopping the car for lack of insurance and confirming 
ownership, to detaining the occupants for a canine drug search "severed the chain of 
rational inference" based on the specific facts "and degenerated" the matter "into an 
attempt to support an as yet 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch."'" 
Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27); see Chapman, 921 P.2d at 453-
54 (stating that continued detention would be justified only if the officer had a reason, 
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independent of the justification for the stop, to further detain); Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 
(stating that investigative detention beyond the justification for the stop "must be 
supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity"). The further 
detention for the purpose of the subsequent search was unlawful. 
Under the law, "[i]f a seizure occurs and the police are unable to point to the 
specific and articulable facts that justified that seizure, the seizure violates the fourth 
amendment of the United States Constitution, and evidence obtained as a result of the 
illegal seizure must be excluded." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991); 
Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764 (where detention was unlawful, "the evidence obtained pursuant 
to the arrest is to be suppressed"). 
Where the state is required to establish that government officials complied with 
Fourth Amendment standards when acting without a warrant, a lack of evidence on the 
matter cannot be held against the defendant. See Christensen, 676 P.2d at 411. It is 
fundamental that if the party who has the burden of producing evidence does not meet 
that burden, the consequence is an adverse ruling on the issue. See id at 411-12 (ruling 
that "[sjince the officers had no warrant, it was the burden of the State to show that the 
search was lawful"; also since the state presented no evidence as to whether the officers 
searched a container under the open-view doctrine, the container would be suppressed). 
In this case, Sanders engaged in an unlawful level-two detention and search. The 
facts presented by the state failed to justify further detention of the vehicle for a drug 
search. The evidence discovered as a result of the unlawful level-two detention should be 
suppressed. This Court may reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion on that basis. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Biggs respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. 
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ADDENDUM A 
3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
TONI LYNN BIGGS, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Pre-Trial Services 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 031100766 FS 
Judge: TERRY CHRISTIANSEN 
Date: October 26, 2005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: mindyg 
Prosecutor: PLAYER, RILEY J 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROMERO, SHANNON N 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: June 26, 1970 
Audio 
Tape Number: 5102 Tape Count: 910 
CHARGES 
(amended) -1. ATTEMPTED POSS OF A C/S 
Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 04/26/2005 Guilty 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED POSS OF A C/S a 
Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 
day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 365 day(s). 
Case No: 031100766 
Date: Oct 26, 2005 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 6 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
No other violations. 
Comply with Adult Probation and Parole. 
Notify the court of any address change. 
Not to possess/consume alcohol or non prescribed controlled 
substance. 
Randon urinalysis and drug testing as requested. 
Notify probation agent of any prescribed medication. 
Not to associate with persons or frequent places where drugs or 
alcohol are being used or are the chief item of sale. 
Submit to search of self or property by probation agent. 
Receive drug and alcohol evaluation and comply with 
recommendations. 
Research paper on drugs. 
Maintain fulltime verifiable employment/education. 
Report to AP&P within 24 hours. 
Deft sentenced to the same terms as case #031101125 
***Zero tolerance** If any violations deft will complete the CATS 
program. 
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ADDENDUM B 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-303.2 (2005) 
41-12a-303.2. Evidence of owner 's or operator 's security 
to be carried when operating motor vehicle — 
Defense — Penalt ies. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Division" means the Motor Vehicle Division of the State Tax 
Commission. 
(b) "Registration materials" means the evidences of motor vehicle 
registration, including all registration cards, license plates, temporary 
permits, and nonresident temporary permits. 
(2) (a) (i) A person operating a motor vehicle shall: 
(A) have in the person's immediate possession evidence of 
owner's or operator's security for the motor vehicle the person is 
operating; and 
(B) display it upon demand of a peace officer. 
(ii) A person is exempt from the requirements of Subsection (2)(a)(i) 
if the person is operating: 
(A) a government-owned or leased motor vehicle; or 
(B) an employer-owned or leased motor vehicle and is driving it 
with the employer's permission. 
(b) Evidence of owner's or operator's security includes any one of the 
following: 
(i) a copy of the operator's valid: 
(A) insurance policy; 
(B) insurance policy declaration page; 
(C) binder notice; 
(D) renewal notice; or 
(E) card issued by an insurance company as evidence of insur-
ance; 
(ii) a certificate of insurance issued under Section 41-12a-402; 
(hi) a certified copy of a surety bond issued under Section 41-12a-
405; 
(iv) a certificate of the state treasurer issued under Section 41-12a-
406; 
(v) a certificate of self-funded coverage issued under Section 41-
12a-407; or 
(vi) information that the vehicle or driver is insured from the 
Uninsured Motorist Identification Database Program created under 
Title 41, Chapter 12a, Par t 8. 
767 
41-12a-303.2 MOTOR VEHICLES 
(c) Evidence of owner's or operator's security from the Uninsured 
Motorist Identification Database Program described under Subsection 
(2)(b)(vi) supercedes any evidence of owner's or operator's security de-
scribed under Subsection (2)(b)(i)(D) or (E). 
(3) It is an affirmative defense to a charge under this section that the person 
had owner's or operator's security in effect for the vehicle the person was 
operating at the time of the person's citation or arrest. 
(4) (a) Evidence of owner's or operator's security as defined under Subsec-
tion (2)(b) except Subsections (2)(b)(i)(D) and (E) or a written statement 
from an insurance producer or company verifying tha t the person had the 
required motor vehicle insurance coverage on the date specified h consid-
ered proof of owner's or operator's security for purposes of Subsection (3) 
and Section 41-12a-804. 
(b) The court considering a citation issued under this section shall allow 
the evidence or a written statement under Subsection (4)(a) and a copy of 
the citation to be faxed or mailed to the clerk of the court to satisfy 
Subsection (3). 
(c) The notice under Section 41-12a-804 shall specify that the written 
statement under Subsection (4j(a) and a copy of the notice shall be faxed 
or mailed to the designated agent to satisfy the proof of owner's or 
operator's security required under Section 41-12a-804. 
(5) A violation of this section is a class B misdemeanor, and the fine shall be 
not less than: 
(a) $400 for a first offense; and 
(b) $1,000 for a second and subsequent offense within three years of a 
previous conviction or bail forfeiture. 
(6) Upon receiving notification from a court of a conviction for a violation of 
this section, the department: 
(a) shall suspend the person's driver license; and 
(b) may not renew the person's driver license or issue a driver license to 
the person until the person gives the department proof of owner's or 
operator's security. 
(i) This proof of owner's or operator's security shall be given by any 
of the ways required under Section 41-12a-401. 
(ii) This proof of owner's or operator's security shall be maintained 
with the department for a three-year period. 
(iii) An insurer that provides a certificate of insurance as provided 
under Section 41-12a-402 or 41-12a-403 may not terminate the 
insurance policy unless notice of termination is filed with the depart-
ment no later than ten days after termination as required under 
Section 4M2a-404 . 
(iv) If a person who has canceled the certificate of insurance applies 
for a license within three years from the date proof of owner's or 
operator's security was originally required, the department shall 
refuse the application unless the person reestablishes proof of owner's 
or operator's security and maintains the proof for the remainder of the 
three-year period. 
History: C. 1953, 41-12a-303.2, enacted by 
L. 1993, ch. 202, § 3; 1994, ch. 59, § 5; 1994, 
ch. 220, § 1; 1996, ch. 33, § 1; 1996, ch. 200, 
§ 1; 1998, ch. 35, § 4; 1999, ch. 216, § 2; 2000, 
ch. 345, § 6; 2003, ch. 298, k 125. 
Amendment Notes . — The 2003 amend-
ment, effective May 5, 2003 substituted "pro-
ducer" for "agent" in Subsection (4)(a) 
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ADDENDUM C 
DAVE) E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
R. JOSH PLAYER, Bar No. 7768 
Deputy District Attorney 
2001 South State Street, Suite 3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Telephone: (801) 468-3422 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
TONI LYNN BIGGS, 
Defendant 
ORDER RE: 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 031100766 FS 
Honorable Terry L. Christiansen 
The foregoing matter came before the Court pursuant to the Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress on February 25, 2005, the Honorable Terry L. Christiansen, District Court 
Judge, presiding. The State of Utah was present and represented by R. Josh Player, 
Deputy District Attorney. The Defendant was present and represented by Shannon 
Romero, Salt Lake Legal Defenders. Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law entered herein, and for good cause appearing, the Court hereby ORDERS 
ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that the Defendant's Motion to suppress is denied. 
i 
Dated this 2 ^ day of _ _ j 4 r t O f _, 2005 
Hon. Terry LXChristiansen 
Distnet^oufnudge 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER RE: 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS was delivered to SHANNON ROMERO, attorney for the 
Defendant, TONI LYNN BIGGS, at 424 East 500 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on 
this 21. day of AJQW \ 2005. 
/l/-h^ 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
R. JOSH PLAYER, Bar No. 7768 
Deputy District Attorney 
2001 South State Street, Suite 3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Telephone: (801) 468-3422 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
TONI LYNN BIGGS, 
Defendant 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 031100766 FS 
Honorable Terry L. Christiansen 
The foregoing matter came before the Court pursuant to the Defendant's Motion 
to Suppress on February 25, 2005, the Honorable Terry L. Christiansen, District Court 
Judge, presiding. The State of Utah was present and represented by R. Josh Player, 
Deputy District Attorney. The Defendant was present and represented by Shannon 
Romero, Salt Lake Legal Defenders. The State called Ken Stuart of Insure-Rite and 
Officer Wade Sanders of the West Valley Police Department as witnesses. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the first determination that must be made when analyzing 
a search and seizure issue arising out of a traffic stop is whether the peace officer's 
actions were justified at the inception of the stop. 
2. The Court finds that the traffic stop of the Defendant was justified at its 
inception. The Court finds that a peace officer that has reasonable suspicion that a 
driver is operating a vehicle without insurance is justified in stopping that vehicle. 
The peace officer is not required to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
driver does not have insurance on the vehicle. In support of its findings, the Court 
noted that in State v. Hansen, 63 P.2d 650, 660, 2002 Ut 125 1[30 (2002) the Utah 
Supreme Court found that an officer was justified in making an initial traffic stop was 
reasonable when he observed Mr. Hansen make an improper lane change and was 
suspected of driving without insurance. The Court also noted that an officer is 
justified in stopping a driver for a defective taillight ** <Avw^ *7* 1lV* 
3. The Court finds Mr. Stuart to be a credible witness. The Court finds that Mr. 
Stuart's testimony regarding the problem of uninsured motorists in 1995 to be 
credible. In 1995, when the Utah State Legislature was considering the uninsured 
motorist problem, approximately 23% of vehicles were uninsured. The Court finds 
that rate of uninsured motorists to have been a serious problem in light of the number 
of traffic accidents and resulting injuries. The victims of uninsured motorists are 
placed in a precarious position. 
4. The Court finds that the development of the Uninsured Motorists 
Identification Database Program and the attendant laws and regulations have been 
very effective in reducing the number of uninsured vehicles. Specifically, the Court 
finds that approximately 94% of all vehicles in Utah are now insured. 
5. The Court finds that there is a significant public policy interest in having 
peace officers check whether or not a vehicle is insured. If a motorist drives a vehicle 
that is not insured, and the driver is not otherwise insured, an accident can absolutely 
devastate the life of the victim of the accident. For instance, if an accident caused by 
an uninsured vehicle and motorists results in another's death or serious bodily injury, 
the victim or his family is left in a tremendously difficult position. 
2 
6. The Court finds that the Utah State Legislature wants peace officers to ensure 
that vehicles are insured and set up the Uninsured Motorists Identification Database 
Program to enable that end. Further, the Court finds that it is a standard procedure for 
peace officers to check for insurance on vehicles. 
7. The Court finds Officer Sanders to be a credible witness. The Court also finds 
that Officer Sanders checked the Uninsured Motorists Identification Database 
Program. The Uninsured Motorists Identification Database indicated that the vehicle 
was not insured. The Court finds that a showing of no insurance on the Uninsured 
Motorists Identification Database established a reasonable, articulable suspicion that 
there was no insurance on Defendant's vehicle. Accordingly, Officer Sanders 
rightfully conducted a stop of the vehicle based upon his reasonable and articulable 
suspicion that the vehicle was not insured. 
8. The Court also finds that society's interest in protecting victims from 
uninsured vehicles overwhelmingly outweighs the inconvenience to an individual of 
being stopped by an officer who finds the vehicle to be coded as uninsured on the 
Uninsured Motorists Identification Database. 
9. The Court finds that the Defendants motion to suppress should be denied as 
the officer's stop was justified at its inception. 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the Court hereby makes the following 
i 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that Officer Sanders stop was justified at its inception 
based upon his reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle was not insured. 
2. The Court concludes that the Defendant's Motion to Suppress should be 
denied. 
Dated this 24? day of , 2005 
BY THE CO 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was delivered to SHANNON ROMERO, 
attorney for the Defendant, TONI LYNN BIGGS, at 424 East 500 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 on this "Z.\ day of __JAprj_\___, 2005. 
^k^Z 
<; 
